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STAY EAST, YOUNG MAN? MARKET REPERCUSSIONS OF THE
DRED SCOTT DECISION
JENNY B. WAHL*
[I]t is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which prohibited a
citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of
the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by
the Constitution, and is therefore void ....
Dred Scott v. Sandford'
INTRODUCTION
With a single sentence, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger
Taney affirmed the value of one type of property-slaves-and undercut
the value of another-western land. Uncertainty about land markets suf-
fused the economy in family decisions about whether and where to migrate,
in the transportation sector (particularly railroads), in financial markets, and
in politics.
Scarce data make it difficult to pinpoint the exact economic impact of
Dred Scott alone. 2 If the case occurred today, economists might conduct an
event study using detailed time series to determine whether it significantly
affected various markets. 3 Lacking such data, this paper instead assembles
* Many thanks to Gavin Wright, Ned Wahl, Jon Pritchett, Bill Melton, Mike Hemesath, Mark
Kanazawa, Nathan Grawe, and Paul Finkelman for their thoughtful comments. I am especially grateful
to Warren Weber, Kristin Partlo, and Gavin Wright for help in locating sources, and to Dean Pettinga
and Kathryn Vikingstad for editing assistance.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,452 (1857).
2. 1 focus primarily upon the near-term implications of Dred Scott. Others have argued that, by
forcing black Americans to rely upon courts for protection, the decision has had long-term effects
including welfare dependency. See, e.g., William Darity, Jr. & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Changes in Black
Family Structure: Implications for Welfare Dependency, 73 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 59,
59-61 (1983).
3. For a lucid discussion of event studies, see A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics
and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997). Economic historians have used event studies to
examine the effects of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. See, e.g., Robin A. Prager, Using Stock
Price Data to Measure the Effects of Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act and the Railroad Indus-
try, 20 RAND J. ECON. 280 (1989). Until William Buck Dana established the Commercial and Finan-
cial Chronicle in 1865, however, frequent and regular price series were not widely available. See
DOUGLAS STEEPLES, ADVOCATE FOR AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: WILLIAM BUCK DANA AND THE
COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, 1865-1910, at 40-45 (2002) (recounting the history of this
publication). Interestingly enough, Jonathan Pritchett, Charles Calomiris, and Larry Schweikart are just
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information from numerous sources to make the following argument: Dred
Scott depressed the value of land in U.S. territories and thus stemmed the
tide of migration westward, lowered the worth of investments in western
railroads, and contributed to the financial panic that took place in the fall of
1857. These events provided a foothold for the emerging Republican Party,
which in turn set the path for politics and policy for the next several dec-
ades.
I. THE LEGALITY OF SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED
STATES
The history of where slavery was legal in the United States and where
it was not can be confusing. Chart 1 summarizes the important develop-
ments pertaining to the Dred Scott case, going back to the birth of the re-
public. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 outlawed slavery in the area
north and west of the Ohio River, which included the future states of Illi-
nois and Wisconsin as well as part of Minnesota. 4 Much of the Louisiana
Purchase of 1803-which included Missouri and more of Minnesota-lay
northwest of the Ohio River and was free soil under the Northwest Ordi-
nance. In 1819, Missouri wanted to enter the Union as a slave state, arguing
that the Northwest Ordinance did not apply to land west of the Mississippi
River.5 This led to the Missouri Compromise, which contained the Thomas
Amendment that stated all territories of the Louisiana Purchase north of
latitude 36030 ' were free, except for Missouri. 6 Missouri thus became a
slave state in 1820; Maine (formerly part of Massachusetts) entered as a
free state the same year. 7
beginning an event study using New Orleans slave sale prices to ascertain the effect of Dred Scott on
that market. E-mail from Jonathan Pritchett, Associate Professor of Economics, Tulane University, to
author (Feb. 14, 2006) (on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review).
4. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS 34-79 (1996) (discussing the history of
slavery prohibition in the Northwest Ordinance).
5. See PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 8
(1997).
6. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (commonly known as the Missouri Compro-
mise); J. Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645 (resolution admitting Missouri into the Union).
7. See Act of Mar. 3, 1820, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 544 (admitting Maine into the Union); FINKELMAN,
supra note 5, at 8.
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CHART 1
Slavery in the Territories: A Brief Timeline
Date Event and Consequences
1787 The Northwest Ordinance outlawed slavery in the area north
and west of Ohio River, including the future states of Illi-
nois and Wisconsin, as well as part of Minnesota.
1803 The U.S. entered into the Louisiana Purchase. Most of the
Purchase lay north and west of Ohio River, including the
future states of Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, North and
South Dakota, and much of the remainder of Minnesota.
1820 The Thomas Amendment of the Missouri Compromise
stated that all territories of the Louisiana Purchase north of
latitude 36030'-except Missouri-were free.
1833-36 Dred Scott lived in Illinois.
1836-40 Dred Scott lived in Minnesota (part of Wisconsin Territory).
1847 The Mexican Cession was added to the U.S. after the war
with Mexico. It included California, Nevada, Utah, parts of
Colorado and New Mexico, and most of Arizona.
1850 The Compromise of 1850 admitted California as a free state
and organized the rest of the Mexican Cession as non-
interventionist (that is, permitted slavery in the region).
1854 The Kansas-Nebraska Act allowed settlers to decide
whether slavery could exist in the territory of the same
name (which stretched north to Canada and included the
Dakotas), although the decision process was not well-
specified.
Mid-1856 The sack of Lawrence, Kansas occurred, as well as other
bloody events.
Feb. 1857 Kansas pro-slavers initiated a statehood movement, creating
more tension in the territory.
Mar. 1857 The Dred Scott decision .erased the 36030 ' line and opened
all territories to slavery.
To claim his right to freedom, Dred Scott referred to the Northwest
Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise in conjunction with his residence
in Illinois in 1833-36 and Minnesota (then part of the Wisconsin Territory)
2007]
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in 1836-40.8 By alluding to the Missouri Compromise, however, Scott's
case opened Pandora's box: how should the Thomas Amendment apply to
territories acquired after 1820?
This box had been opened before. Although David Wilmot suggested
that slavery should be prohibited in the Mexican Cession-the spoils of the
war of 1846-47-his proposal failed. 9 The Compromise of 1850 admitted
California as a free state and organized the remainder of the Cession-
Nevada, Utah, parts of Colorado and New Mexico, and most of Arizona-
as non-interventionist, meaning that slavery could exist there. 10
Less than five years later, the box was opened again. On January 4,
1854, Stephen Douglas introduced a bill to organize Nebraska as one large
territory from latitude 36o30 ' all the way to Canada. 11 This eventually
passed as the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which permitted settlers to determine
whether slavery could exist in the named territory.12 The Act therefore
repealed part of the Thomas Amendment, although it did not make particu-
larly clear the process by which the citizens of a territory would choose to
allow or exclude slavery. 13
The ambiguity of the Kansas-Nebraska Act led to bitter conflict both
in the nation's capital and on its frontier. The Democrats lost control of the
House of Representatives in the 1854-55 elections. 14 May 1856 brought
the sack of Lawrence, Kansas; John Brown's murders along the Pottawa-
tomie; and Charles Sumner's caning by Preston Brooks in the Senate
chamber. 15 In February 1857, proslavery territorial legislators added to the
tension by initiating a Kansas statehood movement.16
8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432-35 (1857).
9. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 128-31 (1978) [hereinafter FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS]; see also
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 61-62 (1981) [hereinafter FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY].
10. See FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 157-77.
11. Seeid. at l81.
12. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854). For the Senate vote on the Act, see CONG.
GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 531-32 (1854). For the Senate debate on the Act, see CONG. GLOBE, 33d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 279-342.
13. See Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277.
14. See FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 188.
15. See S. REP. NO. 34-191 (1856); H.R. REP. NO. 34-182 (1856); DAVID DONALD, CHARLES
SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 278-311 (1960); FEURENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS, supra note 9, at 193; DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 208-13 (Don
E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976).
16. The movement culminated in the election of proslavery delegates to a constitutional conven-
tion. FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 458. Free-soilers had refused to
participate in what they considered a fraudulent process. See id. at 458-62. Pro-slavers began meeting
in September in Lecompton but suspended operations until after the October congressional election. See
id. at 461. Newly appointed territorial governor Robert Walker then installed a legally elected antislav-
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Amidst the turmoil, the Dred Scott case reached the docket of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Justice Taney's opinion officially erased the 36'30 ' line.17
Until Abraham Lincoln resided in the White House, nothing prevented
slavery from legally entering any U.S. territory after March 6, 1857.18 This
fact had important consequences for westward migration and the value of
investments in the territories.
II. REGIONAL PRODUCTION PROCESSES, TERRITORIAL STATUS, AND
DECISIONS TO MIGRATE WESTWARD
A. Asset Values, Production Technology, and Local Development in the
Mid-I 850s: Theory and Regional Evidence
A key factor in a Northerner's decision to migrate into the territories
in the mid-1800s was whether free soil would surround him. Ideology
played a part, but so did economics. To understand why, consider the na-
ture of regional production. Jeffersonian yeoman farmers epitomized the
North: immobile land was their primary owned asset, and they demon-
strated a preference for proprietorship--even of a small holding-over
hiring themselves out. 19 Labor was thus the scarce factor in agricultural
production. Once settled, free-soil farmers would put their money into land
clearing, schools, towns, transportation, and other forms of local develop-
ment.20 This investment, in turn, would affect the value of the surrounding
area.
21
ery legislature, which drafted its own constitution. See id. The Kansas citizenry voted on the Lecompton
constitution in December and on the antislavery constitution a few days later. See id. at 469. In a costly
move, Stephen Douglas opposed the Lecompton accord, not because it supported slavery, but because it
was not the wish of the majority. See id. at 465-68. In the end, Congress adopted William H. English's
compromise, which proposed that Kansas be admitted under the Lecompton constitution, but only after
Kansas voters approved standard federal land grants for the state. See id. at 479-82. If the Kansas voters
rejected the federal land grants, which they later did, then Kansas could not be considered for admission
until its population had reached the federal ratio for one representative in Congress. See id. Kansas was
later admitted to the Union on January 29, 1861. See Act of Jan. 29, 1861, ch. 20, 12 Stat. 126.
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
18. See id. A brief perusal of contemporaneous newspapers shows they were full of editorials and
letters expressing fear that the Scott decision opened the territories-indeed, the entire nation-to
slavery. Even the prospect of Oregon becoming a slave state was a serious one. See, e.g., Oregon to be
a Slave State, FARMERS' CABINET (Amherst, N.H.), Apr. 2, 1857; Letter to the Editor, Letter from
Oregon, INDEP. (Harrisonburg, La.), March 19, 1857, at 2; Letter to the Editor, Slavery Extension in
Oregon, NAT'L ERA, March 26, 1857, at 51.
19. GAVIN WRIGHT, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COTTON SOUTH 45 (1978).
20. See Gavin Wright, Slavery and American Agricultural History, 77 AGRIC. HIST. 527, 540
(2003).
21. Northerners moved around, of course. The point is that their main asset was immobile. Even if
people moved, they had an interest in enhancing immobile asset values because any improvements
would be capitalized in the asset sale price.
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The South, in contrast, held much of its wealth in mobile assets-that
is, slaves. 22 Although land was also an important part of the Southerner's
portfolio, the very fact that property could be held in a form not affected by
local development meant Southerners had a different outlook on internal
improvements as well as a production process that emphasized relatively
abundant labor inputs. That Cyrus McCormick, with his labor-saving
reaper, changed the locus of his operations from Virginia to Illinois in the
mid-I 840s is not surprising. 23
Production processes were another difference between the two re-
gions. Southerners practiced "shifting cultivation" and thus held large tracts
of unimproved land, whereas Northerners kept a high proportion of land in
constant use. 24 In 1860, Southerners cultivated only one of every three
owned acres, while Northerners improved more than half their acreage. 25
Northern eyewitnesses, including William Seward, offered disparag-
ing comments about the seeming backwardness of the South. Seward took
three trips South between 1835 and 1857, commenting each time on the
"exhausted soil, old and decaying towns, wretchedly-neglected roads, and,
in every respect, an absence of enterprise and improvement .... -26
Table 1 offers some evidence of the dissimilarity between the North
and the South. Not only did people invest their own and their state's dollars
in internal improvements, they also asked the federal government for spe-
cific land grants to build and refurbish wagon routes, canals, rivers, har-
bors, and railroads. Between 1823 and 1857, the North received one and a
half times as much acreage as the South from such grants, despite the
South's relatively larger geographic size. 27
22. For dollar estimates, see ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE
RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 81-89 (1989), and ROGER L. RANSOM & RICHARD SUTCH,
ONE KIND OF FREEDOM 52-53 (1977). Certainly yeoman farmers existed in the South as well, many of
whom owned no slaves. See, e.g., David F. Weiman, Farmers and the Market in Antebellum America:
A View from the Georgia Upcountry, 47 J. ECON. HIST. 627, 627-37 (1987) (examining patterns of
yeoman farming in two Georgia counties).
23. See WILLIAM T. HUTCHINSON, CYRUS HALL MCCORMICK: SEED-TIME, 1809-1856, at 208-
09, 246 (1930).
24. See John Majewski & Viken Tchakerian, The Environmental Origins of Shifting Cultivation
in the Nineteenth-Century U.S. South 2-3 (Mar. 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/majewskiltems/EO.pdf.
25. Id. at 2.
26. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 41 (1970) (internal quotations omitted).
27. By comparison, the total square miles (including land and water) in the South exceeded that in
the North-about 917,000 to about 628,000. Texas includes about 268,000 square miles. The disputed
areas of Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, and Colorado comprise about 411,000 square miles. For geo-
graphic area by state, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITES STATES:
2006, at 221, tbl.347 (2005).
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TABLE 128
Specific Federal Land Grants for Internal Improvements, 1823-1857
Years Region Acreage Purpose
1823-27 Ohio 80,774.54 Wagon Road
1827 Indiana 170,580.24 Wagon Road
1827-48 Indiana 1,480,409.00 Canal
1827 Ohio 1,204,114.00 Canal
1846+ Wisconsin 683,722.00 River
1846+ Iowa 1,161,514.00 River
1850 Illinois 2,595,133.00 Railroad
1856 Iowa 4,507,531.00 Railroad
1856 Michigan 3,103,880.00 Railroad
1856 Wisconsin 560,605.00 Railroad
1857 Minnesota 7,364,269.00 Railroad
TOTAL NORTH: 22,912,531.78
Years Region Acreage Purpose
1828 Alabama 400,016.00 River
1850-56 Mississippi 1,285,743.00 Railroad
1852-53 Missouri 2,438,015.00 Railroad
1852-53, Alabama 3,193,719.00 Railroad
1856
1852-53 Arkansas 3,836,595.00 Railroad
1856 Florida 2,497,719.00 Railroad
1856 Louisiana 699,221.00 Railroad
TOTAL SOUTH: 14,351,028.00
Table 2 offers additional proof of the disparity in transportation net-
works between the regions. By 1850, the six Southern states of Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi had
only 12% of the canal mileage of the six Northern states of New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. If we add one state
to each region-Massachusetts and Louisiana-railroad mileage was
28. See W.J. Donald, Land Grants for Internal Improvements in the United States, 19 J. POL.
ECON. 404, 404 tbls.1 & 2,406 tbl.3, 408 tbl.5 (1911).
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roughly equal in 1840, but Southern states had less than half the mileage of
the Northern states by 1860. In 1860, rail mileage per 1,000 square miles
was 62 for the Northern states but only 22 for their Southern sisters. What
is more, the level of investment per mile in the South was far below the
national average, and Southern lines featured inferior rolling stock and far
greater distances between stations. 29
TABLE 230
Canal and Rail Mileage, North and South, 1830-60
Canals
1830 1840 1850
Northern States
(NY, NJ, PA, OH, IN, IL) 1,041 2,630 3,005
Southern States
(VA, NC, GA, SC, AL, MS) 68 361 361
Railroads
Perhaps the most pertinent piece of information known to Northerners
at the time of the Dred Scott case was that land values in the South were
lower and increased less rapidly than in the North.31 The per-acre value of
farmland in the South had exceeded that in the North at the time of the
American Revolution. 32 By 1850, however, the value of farmland and
buildings in the South was less than half that in the North, and the per-acre
value was only one-third. 33 Even after the cotton boom of the 1850s, the
29. See GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH 21 tbl.2.1, 22 & tbl.2.2 (1986).
30. See id. at 21 tbl.2.1, 22 tbl.2.2 (citing EUGENE ALVAREZ, TRAVEL ON SOUTHERN
ANTEBELLUM RAILROADS, 1828-1860, at 171-72 (1974)).
31. See Gavin Wright, Capitalism and Slavery on the Islands: A Lesson from the Mainland, 17 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 851, 858 (1987).
32. See id. at 859.
33. See id. at 858 tbl.2.
368 [Vol 82:361
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per-acre value in the South was only 43% of the Northern value. 34 Land
values simply rose much faster in the North, and people knew it. As Gavin
Wright puts it, "This emerging perception was very much part of the 1824
[statehood] debate in Illinois (virtually a referendum on slavery), and it was
even more firmly ensconced by the 1850s. ''35
B. The Effect of Territorial Status on the Migration Decision of
Northerners
Converting a territory from free-soil to slave reduced the probability
of migration westward for Northerners, in part because of the anticipated
effect on land values. The following paragraphs will make this point clear.
Suppose the government released western land from the public do-
main. Northern farmers and wage workers would have considered migrat-
ing westward if the benefits exceeded the costs. Costs certainly included
the purchase price of the new land-payment of which would have de-
pended upon government policy toward squatters and preemption rights-
but also encompassed the cost of clearing, fencing, and protecting the new
property, as well as transportation costs to go west, foregone alternative
earnings, and any losses associated with the sale of existing property.36
Balanced against these were the Northerners' expectations of future earn-
ings and capital gains as well as any non-pecuniary feelings of satisfaction
that might have come with ownership.
How would allowing slavery into a territory have affected benefits and
costs to the prospective Northern emigrant? A threshold question is
whether permitting slavery necessarily meant that slaves would come.
Stephen Douglas thought that the Kansas-Nebraska Act was all symbol and
no substance: in his view, slavery itself would not be viable in the epony-
34. See id.
35. E-mail from Gavin Wright, Professor of American Economic History, Stanford University, to
author (Feb. 16, 2006) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review). For more evidence on land prices
and people's perceptions, see Peter H. Lindert, Long-Run Trends in American Farmland Values, 62
AGRIC. HIST. 45, 47-54 (1988), and Joshua Michael Zeitz, The Missouri Compromise Reconsidered:
Antislavery Rhetoric and the Emergence of the Free Labor Synthesis, 20 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 447, 475-
78 (2000).
36. Woodland cost between $10 and $12 per acre to clear, and prairie cost between $2 and $5, for
example. JEREMY ATACK & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1940, at 276 (2d ed. 1994). Land near railroads cost substantially more than the
standard $1.25 per acre. For example, the Illinois Central Railroad offered land for $8 to $12 per acre.
Id. at 275. Anderson and Hill make the excellent point that the price at which public land was sold
(which could be artificially low) could generate a race for property rights. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J.
Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L. & Econ. 177, 195 (1990). Individual benefits from merely
acquiring land, therefore, did not necessarily translate into social benefits. This aspect of the individ-
ual's cost-benefit calculus does not alter the essence of my argument.
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mous territory. 37 Yet the evidence overwhelmingly shows that slavery
could thrive in the territories. Gavin Wright makes this abundantly clear,38
and Abraham Lincoln himself displayed a map showing the climactic and
soil similarities between the Kansas-Nebraska territory and various South-
ern regions. 39 Weiman's study of the market in public lands in Georgia
suggests that wealthy slave owners made up a disproportionate share of
bidders at auctions, as they had the wherewithal to buy land ahead of using
it.40 Opening a territory to slavery might not have brought slaves in as
neighbors immediately, then, but the Georgia study suggests that frontier
settlers could have reasonably expected them later.
Chart 2 shows that the slave population definitely moved westward
during the two decades preceding the Civil War and that the largest rate of
growth occurred along the border of the western territory. Slaves grew
increasingly valuable as well: a steep upward spike in slave prices occurred
just after Dred Scott came to closure.4 1 Evans reports average sale and hire
prices for the upper and lower South for five-year periods. 42 Sale prices in
the upper South were $529 in 1841-45, $709 in 1846-50, $935 in 1851-55,
and $1,294 in 1856-60. 43 Prices were about 30% higher in the lower
South.a4
37. See Letter of Stephen Douglas to the Editor of the Concord (New Hampshire) State Capitol
Reporter (Feb. 16, 1854), in THE LETTERS OF STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 284, 289-90 (Robert W. Johann-
sen ed., 1961). David Potter, among others, argues that Douglas never thought that slavery would
flourish in much of the region. See POTTER, supra note 15, at 171-72. Rather, Potter and other scholars
suggest that he wrote the bill advocating popular sovereignty as a sop to Southerners in exchange for a
greater likelihood of a transcontinental railroad being built near lands that Douglas owned. See id. at
152, 170; WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 154-55.
38. See Wright, supra note 20.
39. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
167 (2005).
40. David F. Weiman, Peopling the Land by Lottery? The Market in Public Lands and the Re-
gional Differentiation of Territory on the Georgia Frontier, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 835, 836 (1991).
41. See Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Structure of Slave Prices in New Orleans, 1804 to 1862, 17
ECON. INQUIRY 496, 498 fig.1 (1979) (offering a chart of slave prices in New Orleans from 1820 to
1862, which shows a continuous increase from 1845 to 1860).
42. Robert Evans, Jr., The Economics of American Negro Slavery, 1830-1860, in NAT'L BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH, ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 184, 216 tbl. 19 (1962).
43. Id.
44. See id.
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CHART 245
Percent of Slave Population by Region, 1840-1860
1840 distribution 1850 distribution
So free-soilers were right to think that allowing slavery into a territory
might bring slaves in, whether they arrived with their masters or were sold
to new ones. 46 This, in turn, had implications for how the region would
develop, how public funds would be allotted, and how land values would
appreciate. Because private and public investments would be divided
among multiple assets under a slave regime rather than devoted primarily
to immobile property, expected benefits for small, non-slaveholding enter-
prises would be less than in a free-soil environment. Moreover, Southerners
were likely to bring with them familiar agricultural practices, which in-
45. The states are grouped in the following categories: the Old South (Florida, Georgia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia), the Cotton South (Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi), the
Northern Border (Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee), and the West-
ern Border (Arkansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah).
The data on which these charts are based were obtained from Geostat Center, Univ. Va.
Library, Historical Census Browser, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/collections/stats/histcensus (last visited
Dec. 31, 2006). The number of total slaves in each state can be obtained by clicking on the desired year,
"Slave Population," and then "total slaves."
46. Jonathan Pritchett finds that about half the slaves migrated from the exporting to the importing
areas of the South with their masters and half were sold. See Jonathan B. Pritchett, Quantitative Esti-
mates of the United States Interregional Slave Trade, 1820-1860, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 467, 467 68
(2001).
1860 distribution
~[ Old South
* Cotton South
* Northern Border
[ Western Border
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cluded shifting cultivation. Added to this was a large dose of racism and a
panic about slave insurrections that grew palpable in the months just before
Dred Scott was decided.47 Even if many of the fears of freeholders were
not borne out-virtually no slaves ever made it to Nevada, New Mexico, or
Utah, despite the legality of slavery there48-- expectations were what mat-
tered.49
C. Westward Migration by Southerners
If Northerners were less likely to migrate, why wouldn't eager South-
erners simply replace them? Presumably, the shift in status from free-soil to
slave altered the desirability of territories to Southerners as well as North-
erners.
50
Southerners certainly bought land in the territories and western states:
Gates reports that Southerners purchased 800,000 acres in the upper Mis-
sissippi Valley after the Kansas-Nebraska Act took effect.51 By 1857, a
group of Virginians was among the largest landholders in Iowa, Missouri,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Kansas, and Nebraska.52 Louisiana senator (and
prominent Confederate-to-be) John Slidell bought 45,000 acres in Wiscon-
sin and Iowa in the period of 1857-58. 53
47. Berwanger notes the prevalence of racism among Northerners. EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE
FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY 1, 4 (1967). For a description of the growing fears of slave insurrection
during 1856-57, see Charles B. Dew, Black Ironworkers and the Slave Insurrection Panic of 1856, 41
J.S. HIST. 321 (1975) and Harvey Wish, The Slave Insurrection Panic of 1856, 5 J.S. HIST. 206 (1939).
Some of these fears were fueled by actual uprisings, others by unsubstantiated rumors. Regardless of
the truth, what mattered for migration decisions were people's perceptions that slaves were increasingly
likely to cause unrest. Jeffrey S. Adler goes so far as to claim that St. Louis declined in importance
relative to Chicago because eastern capitalists became reluctant to invest in a slaveholding state. See
JEFFREY S. ADLER, YANKEE MERCHANTS AND THE MAKING OF THE URBAN WEST: THE RISE AND FALL
OF ANTEBELLUM ST. LOUIS 175-77 (1991).
48. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 24 tbl.A195-209 (Bicentennial ed. 1975).
49. After Dred Scott, people even feared that the Supreme Court might declare that states had no
say in determining whether slavery could exist within their borders. Another case-Lemmon v. People,
20 N.Y. 562 (1860)-is sometimes referred to as the "second Dred Scott" case for this reason. Lemmon
was working its way through the New York courts just before the Civil War and may have landed on
the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court had the War not intervened. In Lemmon, slaves traveling circui-
tously from Virginia to the lower South were freed by a writ of habeas corpus while in New York. See
id. at 599-602. The slaveowner claimed that his property rights should have been protected. See id. at
565-76.
50. John Majewski cogently points out that the Freeport Doctrine later created uncertainty for
Southerners, likely changing their migration patterns in the post-Scott years as well. E-mail from John
Majewski, Associate Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara, to author (Mar. 14,
2006) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
51. Paul Wallace Gates, Southern Investments in Northern Lands Before the Civil War, 5 J.S.
HIST. 155, 179 (1939).
52. Id. at 163.
53. Id. at 173.
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Yet Wright notes that many Southerners were quite comfortable stay-
ing where they were throughout the 1850s. 54 Improved acreage was grow-
ing more rapidly than the population in every single cotton state, meaning
that migration was not necessary to keep the cotton growing.55 What is
more, the sheer number of potential migrants was much smaller in the
South. Table 3 shows the number and percentage of white persons in each
region in 1840, 1850, and 1860. One final important note: if Southern pat-
terns of land value and growth were transplanted west, even a full replace-
ment of population would not have yielded the same effect on land values
as migration by Northerners. As we shall see in a later section, Dred Scott
appeared to affect land markets as well as migration patterns.
54. See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 132-33; Wright, supra note 3 1.
55. See WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 133. Some controversy exists as to whether Southerners would
have even wanted to expand slavery into the new territories. Because slave prices depended heavily on
cotton prices and expansion could cause the price of cotton to fall, Southerners may well have liked to
keep cotton and slaves contained in existing slave states in order to keep the price of slaves high. See
Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Sebastian E. Pinera. The Old South's Stake in the Inter-Regional Movement of
Slaves, 1850-1860, 37 J. ECON. HIST. 434 (1977); Peter Passell & Gavin Wright, The Effects of Pre-
Civil War Territorial Expansion on the Price of Slaves, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1188 (1972). But see Mark
Schmitz & Donald Schaefer, Paradox Lost: Westward Expansion and Slave Prices Before the Civil
War, 41 J. ECON. HIST. 402 (1981) (using a simulation study to find that westward expansion was not
likely to reduce the price of slaves). Something these analyses do not discuss, however, is the effect on
expectations of denying slavery in the territories. Suppose this action were seen as a precursor to ban-
ning slavery in general. Slave prices could have fallen much more in this situation than if slavery were
lawful in the territories. What we actually observed were ever-increasing sale and hire prices for slaves
from 1840 onward. See Evans, supra note 42, at 216 tbl.19.
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TABLE 356
Distribution of White Population by Region, 1840-60
Region 1840 White 1840 White 1850 White 1850 White 1860 White 1860 White
Pop. (N) Pop.(%) Pop. () Pop. () p () Pop. (%)
NORTH 6,618,767 47% 8,477,082 43% 10,438,028 37%
Northeast
(CN, ME, MA,
NH, NJ, NY, PA,
R, VT)
Midwest Free 2,392,380 17 3,325,275 17 4,377,660 16
(IN, MI,OH)
Border Free 545,927 4 1,342,671 7 4,151,763 15
(IA,WI, IL)
California 0 91,635 0 358,110 1
NORTH TOTAL 9,557,074 67% 13,236,663 68% 19,325,561 69%
TERRITORIES -% 19,125 0% 404,586 1%
(CO, ND, SD,
KS, MN, NE,
OR, WA)
SOUTH 407,422 3% 527,053 3% 667,270 2%
Southeast
(DE,DC,MD)
Atlantic 1,920,450 14 2,291,166 12 2,637,838 9
(FL,GA,NC,SC,
VA)
Cotton South 672,716 5 977,723 5 1,237,626 4
(Al, LA, MS)
Midwest Slave 1,230,880 9 1,520,249 8 1,746,501 6
(KY,TN)
Border Slave 401,062 3 754,193 4 1,387,632 r
(AR,MO)
New Slave 226,889 1 550,752 2
(NV,NM,TX,UT)
SOUTH TOTAL 4,632,530 3% 5,297,273 32% 8,227,619 29%
TOTAL 14,189,604 1 19,553,061 17,957,766
56. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 48, at 24 tbl.A195-209.
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D. Regional Changes in the White Immigrant and Native-Born Popula-
tions in the 1850s
Because Dred Scott was decided in 1857, we can glean only a small
amount of information from the federal decennial censuses on how the case
affected population growth and migration. Perhaps the most notable piece
of information the censuses provide has to do with Illinois: this state hosted
one-quarter of the total increase in the white population in the U.S. from
1850 to 1860. As Chart 3 vividly depicts, the growth rate of the white
population in Illinois shot up in the 1850s relative to the 1840s, whereas
that of its neighbors Iowa and Wisconsin slowed down. Numerically, the
nearly 1.9 million increase in the Illinois population from 1850 to 1860 far
outstripped the 1.3 million population increase in Iowa, Wisconsin, and all
the disputed territories put together. These figures alone suggest that set-
tlers may have been reluctant to push as far west in the decade before the
Civil War as they were in the previous decade. 57
CHART 358
White Population in Selected Regions, 1840-60
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57. California and Utah present unusual cases. California lured people west with the promise of
gold, and Utah's population increase was comprised mainly of Mormons, who had their own reasons
for moving to the territory. See generally JON KRAKAUER, UNDER THE BANNER OF HEAVEN (2003)
(providing a recent account of Mormon history).
58. See Geostat Center, supra note 45. To obtain the total number of free whites in each state,
click the desired year, then "Ethnicity/Race/Place of Birth," and then "total free whites."
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Some population growth came from a natural increase of the in-state
population, but for many areas migration from abroad and from other parts
of the U.S. was also quite important in the decade of the 1850s. What Table
4 shows is something well-known: foreign immigrants-who comprised
some 15% of all whites in the nation-tended to avoid slave states. Two-
thirds of the foreign-born population resided in six states in 1860: New
York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts.
Of the total increase in the foreign-born population from 1850 to
1860, New York received nearly 20%, Illinois 11.5%, and Wisconsin 9%.
Chicago was growing slightly faster than the rest of the state, but many of
the new settlers came for the rich Illinois farmland. Minnesota was the one
territory receiving greater than 1% of the increase in foreign-born residents.
Of the slave states, only Missouri received more than 1.5% of the increase
in foreign-born residents during the decade of the 1850s. Most slave states
had a static population of foreign-born inhabitants.
TABLE 459
Distribution and Growth of the Foreign-Born Population in the Fast-
est-Growing Areas, 1850 and 1860
State Number of % Total Number of % Total % Of Change
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign in Number
Born 1850 Born 1850 Born 1860 Born 1860 Foreign Born
NY 655,929 29% 1,001,280 24% 18.6%
IL 111,892 5 324,643 8 11.5
WI 110,477 5 276,927 7 9.0
PA 303,417 13 430,505 10 6.9
CA 21,802 1 146,528 4 6.7
OH 218,193 10 328,249 8 5.9
MA 164,024 7 260,106 6 5.2
MI 54,703 2 149,093 4 5.1
IA 20,969 1 106,077 3 4.6
MO 76,592 3 160,541 4 4.5
IN 55,572 2 118,284 3 3.4
MN 1,977 0 58,728 1 3.1
59. See Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born
Population of the United States: 1850-1990, at tbl. 13 (Population Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Working Paper No. 29, 1999), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/
twps0029/twps0029.html. The table includes only areas for which the total change was 3% or greater.
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What happened to the native-born population during the 1850s? The
best information we have comes from Joseph P. Ferrie, who tracks house-
hold-level data with the public-use micro sample of the censuses from 1850
and 1860.60 Table 5 reports the net migration of this sample. 61 What we
observe is that the greatest likelihood of movement of the native-born
population between 1850 and 1860 occurred through (1) migration from
the West Central states back to New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and the
East North Central regions,62 and (2) migration from the East South Central
region to the West North Central region (which included Missouri), and
from the South Atlantic and East South Central regions to the West South
Central region. For example, if we were to track 10,000 native-born indi-
viduals living in the East South Central and West North Central regions in
1850, Ferrie's data suggest that we would expect to see 781 moving from
the former to the latter and 280 moving the other way. On net, 501 would
migrate from the East South Central region to the West North Central. In
short, Northern natives were moving west to east, and Southern natives
were moving east to west. Some Southerners who were already in central
regions moved north.
60. Joseph P. Ferrie, Internal Migration, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
MILLENNIAL EDITION ONLINE (Susan B. Carter et al. eds, 2007), http://hsus.cambridge.org/
HSUSWeb/toc/hsusHome.do.
61. Because the sample size was so small for the Mountain/Pacific region (27 people), I do not
include it in this table. See id. at 1-493 tbl.Ac-E. Of these 27, about half remained in the area, about
11% moved to the South Central region, and the remainder moved northeast. See id.
62. Bill Melton's work on Manitowoc, Wisconsin, has unearthed several examples of men who
moved into Wisconsin in the late 1830s to make their fortunes, then relocated back to New England. E-
mail from Bill Melton to author (Feb. 20, 2006) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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TABLE 563
Net Migration of the Native-Born Population by Region, 1850-1860
(percent)
West North Central to New England 0.85%
West North Central to Mid Atlantic 3.79
West North Central to East North Central 1.39
TOTAL 6.02%
West South Central to New England 1.46%
West South Central to Mid Atlantic 3.71
West South Central to East North Central 5.17
TOTAL 10.34%
East South Central to West North Central 5.01%
East South Central to West South Central 1.45
South Atlantic to West South Central 0.94
TOTAL 7.40%
Censuses of the western states taken between the federal census years
tell more about population movements: in Iowa, for example, the average
annual rate of growth in population between 1850 and 1856 was 17%.64
Between 1856 and 1858 the annual rate fell to 13%; the rate plummeted
between 1858 and 1860 to a mere 3%.65
Fishlow offers supporting data on passenger rail traffic during the
intercensal years.66 Of the six major east-west arteries traversing Ohio, the
number of through passengers dropped from 581,000 in 1857-58 to
367,000 in 1859-60, even as the number of tons of freight increased. 67 On
net, the number of westem-to-eastern through passengers on lines entering
Chicago went from 108,000 in 1856 to 10,000 in 1860.68
63. See Ferrie, supra note 60, at 1-493 tbl.Ac-E. Ferrie's data in his Table Ac-E indicate move-
ment in both directions; Table 5 in this paper simply calculates the net movement between any two
regions. See id. Ferric defines regions slightly differently. The regions in Table 5 are as follows: New
England (CN, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Mid Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA), East North Central (IN, IL, MI, OH,
WI), West North Central (MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS), West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX),
East South Central (KY, TN, AL, MS), and South Atlantic (DE, MD, DC, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL).
64. See ALBERT FISHLOW, AMERICAN RAILROADS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ANTE-
BELLUM ECONOMY 114 n.33 (1965).
65. See id.
66. Id. at 202-03.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 203.
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The slowing of population growth during the latter half of the 1850s in
the territories and the Northern states bordering western territories was
partly due to a fall-off in immigration from overseas. The total in-migration
from abroad was certainly a function of push factors like the Irish Potato
Famine of 1845-50 as well as pull factors like expectations about slavery.
But what is most notable is the changing location of final settlement
for all migrants, foreign- and native-born alike. The data suggest that the
furious pace of westward movement slowed considerably about the time
the Dred Scott decision was made public. In the North, both foreign- and
native-born east-to-west migrants were more likely to terminate their trek
in Illinois rather than points west. The relatively less numerous Southerners
did move west but could not fill up the prairie nearly as fast as their North-
ern compatriots.
III. LAND MARKETS
Land markets offer another window into the world of the 1850s. At
first glance, several features seem to complicate nineteenth-century land
markets: the vast amount of public land available; transferable warrants
awarded for military service that entitled the holder to a certain amount of
acreage of unoccupied land; government policy concerning homesteading,
preemption rights, and the timing of land auctions; construction and rumors
of construction of rail lines; land grants to railroads; availability of credit;
and the presence of land speculators.
Yet we can brush aside much of this apparent complexity to focus on
something simple: high prices and large quantities sold signaled great de-
mand, whereas low prices and small quantities sold meant relatively less
demand. What we observe is a large decline in acreage sold and prices paid
from 1856 to 1859, with a noticeable drop-off in the summer of 1857, fol-
lowed by a short rally and then a plunge that coincided with the general
panic that began in autumn. This pattern suggests that the decision in Dred
Scott had an immediate impact on the demand for land and, coupled with
other events, contributed to the long-term decline in land prices. 69
To understand nineteenth-century land markets, one needs to know
about military warrants. Between 1847 and 1855, Congress enacted four
69. Some scholars have speculated that the ending of the Crimean War-and the resulting decline
in demand for U.S. wheat when European farmers went back to their fields-helped explain the fall in
land prices. See, e.g., JAMES L. HUSTON, THE PANIC OF 1857 AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 262
(1987). Calomiris and Schweikart convincingly argue that any Crimean War effect would have shown
up earlier than the dates I am investigating. See Charles W. Calomiris & Larry Schweikart, The Panic of
1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 807, 813-16 (1991).
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bounty land warrant acts granting nearly 61 million acres of unsettled pub-
lic-domain land to veterans of any war or their heirs. 70 Congress also legal-
ized the transfer of warrants to anyone who wanted to buy them.71 Among
those participating in the active secondary market for land warrants were a
host of eager speculators. 72
People could buy public land at auction for cash as well. 73 What could
stymie sales to the highest bidder were squatters, who often occupied some
of the best land before surveyors even arrived.74 To defuse a potentially
explosive situation, the government offered preemption rights to squatters,
adopting the policy formally in 1841. 75 Settlers could buy up to 160 acres
of land at a minimum price of $1.25 per acre. 76 Minimum purchases in
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were 80 acres; the revision of 1832 allowed
settlers in Michigan and Wisconsin to purchase a minimum of 40 acres.77
When problems arose with less desirable land left on the market for long
periods, Congress passed the Graduation Act of 1854 to provide progres-
sive price reduction to a minimum of 12.5¢ per acre for land unsold for
more than 30 years. 78
Public land sales for cash brought revenue to the federal government,
of course, and government auction policy became a source of controversy
about the time the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott.79 Although residents
of different regions were by no means united, Northerners generally pre-
ferred tariffs as a tool for raising revenue whereas Southerners spoke out
for public land auctions.80 During the 1840s, surveyors platted large tracts
70. Robert P. Swierenga, The "'Western Land Business:" The Story of Easley & Willingham,
Speculators, 41 BUs. HIST. REv. 1, 2 n.8 (1967). See generally ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 36, at
258 tbl.9.1 (providing a table of the significant public land laws from 1785 to 1916).
71. Act of Mar. 22, 1852, ch. 19, § 1, 10 Stat. 3, 3; see also Swierenga, supra note 70, at 2-3.
72. See Swierenga, supra note 70, at 3-7. Swierenga, supra note 70, offers plentiful information
about Western land markets.
73. See ATACK & PASSELL, supra note 36, at 254.
74. Id. at 260.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 261.
78. Id. at 260.
79. See Paul W. Gates, The Struggle for Land and the "Irrepressible Conflict, " 66 POL. SCI. Q.
248, 248-49 (1951).
80. Gates and Reid discuss how Southerners viewed the tariff as reducing the profitability of
cotton and internal improvements, therefore subsidizing Northern commerce. See id. at 248-50; Joseph
D. Reid, Jr., Understanding Political Events in the New Economic History, 37 J. ECON. HIST. 302, 324-
25 (1977). Hofstadter points out how low the tariff of 1857 was relative to earlier tariffs. See Richard
Hofstadter, The TariffIssue and the Civil War, 44 AM. HIST. REv. 50, 50 (1938). Huston argues that the
bread riots of 1857 convinced some in the North that they needed a high tariff as well as free land in the
West as a safety valve for disgruntled workers. See HUSTON, supra note 69, at 108. He also suggests
that Southerners resented the increase in federal power inherent in a tariff. See id. at 109.
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of land that were not auctioned until later, giving squatters time to put up
structures and plant crops.81 Advertisements for new public land went to
zero in 1856 and a mere million acres in 1857.82 But President Buchanan
bowed to Southern pressure and ordered over 46 million new acres into the
market (in addition to the already-advertised 80 million acres) over the
period 1858-60, even as tariffs fell to an all-time low. 83
Table 6 shows the importance of military warrants in land markets
after 1855. Arbitrage would tend to equalize cash and warrant prices, how-
ever, so the cash price per acre approximates annual land prices. Note the
decline in both price per acre and number of acres from 1856 through 1859.
Throughout this time, supply generally was not a constraint; the trend in
prices and quantities seems largely a function of declining demand. Consis-
tent with this conclusion is evidence that the rate of return to land specula-
tion in Iowa crashed after about 1854 and did not rise again until 1859.84
TABLE 685
Number and Price of Acres Entered at the Public Land Offices,
1855-1861
Year Warrant Cash Acres % Cash Total Cash Cash Price Per
Acres Acres Receipts Acre
1855 1,345,580 15,729,524 92% $11,485,384 $0.73
1856 8,382,480 9,227,878 52 8,821,414 0.96
1857 6,283,920 4,124,744 40 3,471,522 0.84
1858 5,802,150 3,804,908 40 2,116,768 0.56
1859 2,941,700 3,961,581 57 1,628,187 0.41
1860 2,782,780 3,461,203 55 1,843,630 0.53
1861 2,017,440 1,465,603 42 884,887 0.60
More detailed data on Iowa land warrant prices in the secondary mar-
ket come from Thompson's Bank Note and Commercial Reporters.86 Chart
81. Gates, supra note 79, at 251-52.
82. Id. at 252.
83. Id. at 253.
84. See Robert P. Swierenga, Land Speculator "Profits" Reconsidered: Central Iowa as a Test
Case, 26 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 25 fig.4 (1966).
85. See Gates, supra note 79, at 254 tbl.l.
86. Thompson's does not report quantities, but the buy-sell prices were typically quite close,
suggesting that these markets cleared. Volumes undoubtedly were lower between May 1856 and May
1857, when Iowa land offices closed to all but preemptors so that railroads could complete their selec-
tions. See Swierenga, supra note 70, at 8. But the lack of a spike in prices after May 4 (the day Presi-
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4 records the sell price for various plot sizes on numerous dates in 1857. Of
note is the drop after the Dred Scott opinion was finalized, and the contin-
ued fall after the transcript was printed and distributed widely on May 29.
The evidence from land markets is consistent with that from immigration
data-something significant made the West less attractive starting in mid-
1857.87 To explain the decline in land prices in later quarters of the year-
and how it relates to the Dred Scott case-we must turn to an examination
of financial markets. The next section takes up this topic, focusing particu-
larly on the railroad market.
dent Buchanan opened the Osage, Fort Dodge, and Sioux City offices) suggests that no excess demand
existed. See id.
87. People across the nation followed the case closely. See FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS, supra note 9, at 422 (reporting that the National Intelligencer printed all of the opinions in
full and that newspapers around the country printed at least excerpts). Dred Scott was not the only
important news of the time, of course: June 1857 also marked the month when proslavery delegates
were chosen to attend the Kansas constitutional convention, and autumn brought the widespread panic
in money and credit markets.
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CHART 488
Iowa Land Prices, 1857
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IV. RAILROADS, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND THE EVENTS OF 1857
Railroads were intimately tied to land markets in the nineteenth cen-
tury, partly because they received substantial land grants but mostly be-
cause they both affected and were affected by the expected value of the
land surrounding them.89 Owners of land could find themselves substan-
88. See J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Jan. 10, 1857; J. Thompson,
THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Feb. 14, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE &
COM. REPS., Mar. 28, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Apr. 4, 1857; J.
Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., May 9, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK
NOTE & COM. REPS., June 6, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., July 11,
1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Aug. 8, 1857; J. Thompson,
THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Sept. 12, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE &
COM. REPS., Oct. 17, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON's BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Nov. 28, 1857; J.
Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK NOTE & COM. REPS., Dec. 12, 1857; J. Thompson, THOMPSON'S BANK
NOTE & COM. REPS., Dec. 19, 1857. Land markets were closed for the months of September and Octo-
ber during the financial panic.
89. Between 1850 and 1871, the federal government gave 131 million acres of public land to
railroads, and Texas (which did not cede its land to the national government upon statehood) donated 27
million acres. ATACK AND PASSELL, supra note 36, at 436. In 1850 Congress passed a bill providing for
alternate sections of land for six miles on either side of the railroad line connecting Chicago to Mobile
to be conveyed to the states along the right of way. Id. Money from the sale was used to defray con-
struction costs of the rail line. Id. In return, the rail line was to carry U.S. troops for free and to carry
mail at rates fixed by Congress. Id. These general provisions continued in all subsequent land grants. Id.
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tially richer-at least on paper-if a railroad were built nearby. They could
transport both themselves and their products cheaper and faster by rail than
by wagon. 90 This capitalization of reduced transportation costs into land
values meant that savvy speculators did their best to ascertain where rail-
roads were likely to be constructed so that they could buy up neighboring
plots. 91
By the same token, railroad managers were on the lookout for loca-
tions where people desired to live-greater population meant more traffic
for trains and thus greater potential profits. The value of railroad stock
reflects the accuracy of the company's predictions: if investors thought
railroad companies made good decisions about where to locate tracks, for
example, they were willing to pay more for railroad stocks.
Data about the earnings and stock prices of railroads therefore offer
yet another way to evaluate the economic effects of Dred Scott. Chart 5
shows the net earnings of railroads in fiscal year 1855-56 and calendar
year 1859 on Northern frontier lines, Northern interior lines, and Southern
lines. 92 Chart 6 depicts the proportion of receipts generated by passengers
in those two years. Note particularly the decline in net earnings on the
Northern frontier, coupled with the drop-off in passenger importance on
those lines. By contrast, Southern railroad earnings jumped significantly,
and passenger traffic on the Southern frontier boomed in the later time
period.93
Fishlow estimates that the land subsidy was worth about $400 million, or about 5% of the amount
invested in railroads between 1850 and 1880. Albert Fishlow, Internal Transportation, in AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH 468, 506 (Lance Davis et al. eds., 1972).
90. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 82-83
(1964) (providing evidence of transportation cost differentials).
91. Jonathan Pritchett playfully points to the film Blazing Saddles as an example of this sort of
behavior. E-mail from Jonathan Pritchett, Associate Professor of Economics, Tulane University, to
author (Feb. 14, 2006) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
92. The Northern frontier lines include railroads passing through the North Central region as well
as large lines emanating from New York and Pennsylvania. See FISHLOW, supra note 64, at 174 map 2.
93. The Southern border railroads were located in Tennessee, Texas, and Missouri. See id.
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CHART 594
Railroad Earnings by Region, 1855/56 and 1859
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94. See id. at 328 tbl.43, 337 tbl.44.
95. See id.
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Table 7, which focuses on the net earnings of western railroads as a
percent of the cost of construction, presents much of the same picture.
Overall, the percentage increased 1.6 points from 1849 to 1855/56, then
nearly halved from 1855/56 to 1859. Table 8 indicates that receipts per
mile for Chicago railroads increased from 1855 to 1856, then fell substan-
tially until 1859, finally turning back up in 1860.
TABLE 796
Net Earnings of Western Railroads as a Percent of Construction Cost
State 1849 1855/56 1859
Ohio 7.5% 6.4% 3.7%
Indiana 6.1 6.2 5.2
Michigan 4.2 10.2 4.6
Illinois 8.7 6.8 3.5
Wisconsin 12.5 3.1
Iowa 3.0
OVERALL 5.6% 7.2% 3.7%
TABLE 897
Chicago Railroad Receipts Per Mile
Year Receipts Per Mile
1855 5,300
1856 6,200
1857 5,500
1858 4,300
1859 4,000
1860 4,700
Yearly data are useful for describing overall trends; to decipher the
effects of a particular event, however, shorter-term data can help fill in
details. Recall that the year 1857 brought not only the Dred Scott decision
but also chaos in Kansas and a financial panic that began in the fall.
To ascertain the economic effects of Dred Scott via railroad data, then,
we need to know more about events that occurred concurrently. Some
96. Id. at 178tbl.19.
97. See id. at 187 tbl.22.
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scholars have attributed the woes of the railroads to the Panic of 1857, for
example, which made credit harder to come by for both the railroads and
their customers. 98 This view also points to credit constraints to help explain
depressed land prices in the last part of the year: if people could not borrow
funds to purchase land, we could expect land prices to fall as potential pur-
chasers quit the market.
Calomiris and Schweikart reverse the causality in their important
study, arguing that the declines in asset values preceding the Panic oc-
curred only in a special class of western railroad investments. 99 Notably,
these declines occurred right about the time of the Dred Scott decision,
suggesting that expectations about the profitability of these investments
were intimately tied to the question of slavery in the territories.
Cole charts the gross earnings of railroads by month for 1857, finding
a drop-off for all companies in the early part of the year with the largest
decline occurring in the western subgroup. 100 Cole and Frickey calculate a
monthly index of mostly western railroad stock prices, which fell precipi-
tously from eighty-six dollars in January 1857 to thirty-three in October. 101
By contrast, eastern railroad stocks were already low before 1857 and did
not decline nearly as much. 102 Southern railroad investments and receipts
increased throughout the decade of the 1850s. 103 These patterns suggest a
speculative element in western stocks absent elsewhere.
Information from Thompson's Bank Note and Commercial Reporters
supports this hypothesis. Table 9 contains stock prices for a number of
railroads at various dates in 1857. Chart 7 plots the trends in two indices:
one for lines that served the western region and the other for primarily east-
ern railroads. Although the two have similar patterns for much of the year,
the western index is somewhat more volatile and, notably, falls off faster
than the eastern index after the Dred Scott decision was published.
98. See id. at 114.
99. See Calomiris & Schweikart, supra note 69, at 813.
100. See Arthur H. Cole, Statistical Background of the Crisis of 1857, 12 REv. ECON. STAT. 170,
174 chart 1 (1930).
101. Arthur H. Cole & Edwin Frickey, The Course of Stock Prices, 1825-66, 10 REv. ECON. STAT.
117, 122, 125 chart 4 (1928). The railroads included are the Baltimore & Ohio, Chicago & Rock Island,
Chicago-Burlington-Quincy, Cleveland & Toledo, Illinois Central, Michigan Central, Michigan South-
ern, New York & Erie, New York Central, and Philadelphia & Reading. Id. at 136.
102. See id. at 122.
103. See FISHLOW, supra note 64, at 187; see also Calomiris & Schweikart, supra note 69, at 813.
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TABLE 9104
Stock Prices for Selected Railroads, 1857
Date MI MI Chi LaC Gal Clv CCC III NY NY Clv Nhav
Ct. S. RI MIw Chi. Tol
Him Rdg Hud
Ct Ct Erie Pit
(par) 100 100 100 100 100 50 100 100 100
2/14
3/28
4/4
5/9
6/6
7/11
8/8
9/12
10/17
11/28
12/12
12/19
98 71
96 72
96 70
94 61
94 55
83 51
85 50
65 23
35 11
17 21
53 17
51 22
114 75
103 73
103 72
98 66
96 55
93 60
91 56
78 37
53 21
83 43
79 41
75 43
103 114
105 113
105 132
104 129
103 126
94 122
97 119
90 90
71 85
95 96
95 87
97 91
100 50
54 54
52 55
53 54
41 47
36 49
29 41
32 40
21 17
8 9
16 16
17 13
16 13
100 50 50 100
104. See sources cited supra note 88.
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CHART 7
Trend in Railroad Stock Price Indices
(index par value 100)
120
100
80
- - eastern lines
60 
- western lines
40
20
Feb. Mar. Apr. May. Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dee. Dec.
14 28 4 9 6 11 8 12 17 28 12 19
Date of Thompson Reporter
The fall in railroad stock prices-particularly for western roads-
preceded the all-out commercial crisis that occurred in autumn. 105 The first
victim of the crisis-the New York office of Ohio Life Insurance and Trust
Company-closed its doors on August 24.106 Significantly, the company
held much of its assets in securities of and loans to western railroads. 107
One could reasonably conclude-as Calomiris and Schweikart didl 08-- that
the decline in the value of railroads triggered the financial panic, not the
other way round.
But how could upheaval in rail stocks spark such a financial debacle?
Here is a possible explanation: As the increased risk to the banking system
became more apparent, depositors clamored to convert their holdings to
specie. Convertibility became an issue as banks scrambled to satisfy their
clients. Because no lender of last resort could come to the rescue, bankers
105. Cole also notes a drop in loans and deposits in March 1857. See Arthur H. Cole, The New York
Money Market of 1843 to 1862, 12 REV. ECON. STAT. 30, 30-38 (1930).
106. Calomiris & Schweikart, supra note 69, at 817.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 809.
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then refused to roll over loans to brokers, who had to sell at rock-bottom
prices. 109 The result was a financial panic that reverberated throughout the
nation and across the globe. "10
CONCLUSION: PUTTING TOGETHER THE PIECES
So what was the economic effect of Dred Scott? In short, the decision
put the brakes on westward migration as free-soilers feared the spread of
slavery throughout the territories. The South could not provide the numbers
of bodies to replace the would-be Northern migrants, partly because for-
eigners tended to enter the nation through Northern ports and partly be-
cause the majority of the native-born population resided above the Mason-
Dixon Line.
The slowing of the flow of people westward had an impact on land
markets, dragging prices downward. In turn, uncertainty about the future
profitability of westward expansion affected the value of railroad invest-
ments. The downward spiral in stock prices for western railroads led to
heightened risk in capital markets and ultimately financial panic. The South
weathered the crisis with relatively greater ease, in part because a portion
of its capital holdings-slaves--continued to increase in value at this
time. 1 '
Concurrent events certainly contributed to the tumultuous times of
1857. Among other things, the mayhem in Kansas, a return to normalcy in
Europe as the Crimean War ended, and the fiscal and monetary policies of
the new Buchanan administration added to the disruptions in various mar-
kets. Because much of the migration data we have are from 1850 and 1860,
for instance, disentangling the effects of Dred Scott on settlers' expecta-
tions from those attributable to the Kansas-Nebraska Act is difficult.
But the limited intercensal population data available suggest that early
1857 brought more change than the years just after Stephen Douglas's
109. For an analysis of the Panic of 1837 that also refers to the lack of a lender of last resort, see
Jenny Wahl, He Broke the Bank, but Did Andrew Jackson Also Father the Fed?, in CONGRESS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF SECTIONALISM (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., forthcoming 2007). For a
bird's-eye view of the Panic of 1857, see Cormac 6 Grida & Eugene N. White, The Panics of 1854 and
1857: A View from the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 213 (2003), and Morgan
Kelly & Cormac 6 Grhda, Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 1110 (2000).
110. Hughes suggests that the Panic of 1857 was the first worldwide crisis of modem capitalism.
J.R.T. Hughes, The Commercial Crisis of 1857, 8 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (NEW SERIES) 194, 194
(1956).
111. Rezneck notes that the South did not suffer as much as the North during the Panic; Southern-
ers used this fact to argue that slavery was therefore a blessing. See Samuel Rezneck, The Influence of
Depression upon American Opinion, 1857-1859, 2 J. ECON. HIST. 1,4 (1942).
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brainchild. This seems logical: although the Kansas-Nebraska Act called
into question where slavery might eventually be established, the defeat of
Democrats in the congressional elections of 1854-55 breathed new life into
antislavery forces, manifested particularly in Kansas. 112 The Dred Scott
decision, supported by new president James Buchanan, marked a reversal
for free-soil settlers. 113 Land-market and financial (particularly railroad)
data reinforce this conclusion.
In fact, the data around the time of the decision may actually underes-
timate the impact of the case, because people knew about it for months
beforehand. 114 The timing of events thus suggests that the catalyst for
change could have been the growing awareness that freedom rather than
slavery would have to be protected by positive law. The Dred Scott deci-
sion, above all else, brought this realization home to Northern voters. As
Supreme Court historian Charles Warren suggests, Roger Taney indeed
helped elect Abraham Lincoln to the presidency. 15
112. See FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 91-92. These elections marked the demise of
the Whigs, the rise of the Know-Nothings, and the first stirrings of the Republican Party. See id. at 89-
90. Democrats lost more than 70% of the seats they had held in free states, and only 7 of 44 Northern
Democrats who voted for the Kansas-Nebraska Act were re-elected. Id. at 89. As of December 1855,
the Democrats had lost control of the House of Representatives. See id. at 91-92.
113. Buchanan's inauguration took place two days before the decision became public. See
FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at 312-13. Buchanan almost surely
knew the content of the opinion via communications with Justice Grier: his statement in his inaugural
address that the issue of slavery in the territories was a judicial question is highly suggestive, to say the
least. See id. at 313.
114. The actual structure of the opinion underwent significant change just before it was announced,
however. Initially, the Court appeared to be moving toward using Strader v. Graham as a precedent,
which would allow every state the authority to determine status within its jurisdiction. See id. at 307-
08; William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-1860, 65
J. AM. HIST. 34, 53 (1978). The result would simply have been to uphold the decision by the Missouri
Supreme Court to keep Dred Scott a slave. See FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, supra
note 9, at 307-08. Justice Nelson began drafting an opinion along these lines. See id. But Chief Justice
Taney acceded to the wishes of Southerners to finish the job begun by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. See
POTTER, supra note 15, at 275. By February 14, dissenters Curtis and McLean were rumored to be
addressing the territorial issue. See FEHRENBACHER, AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 9, at
309. Between the 14th and the 19th, the various members of the court put together the historic docu-
ment. See id.
115. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 357 (rev. ed. 1932).
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